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Implications of Crop Yield and
Revenue  Insurance for
Producer Hedging
Keith H. Coble,  Richard G. Heifner, and Manuel Zuniga
New types of crop insurance have expanded the tools from which crop producers may
choose to manage risk. Little is known regarding how these products interact with
futures  and options. This analysis examines optimal futures and put ratios in the
presence of four alternative insurance coverages. An analytical  model investigates
the comparative statics of the relationship between  hedging and insurance.  Addi-
tional numerical analysis is conducted which incorporates futures price, basis, and
yield variability. Yield insurance is found to have a positive effect on hedging levels.
Revenue insurance  tends  to result  in slightly lower hedging  demand than would
occur given the same level of yield insurance  coverage.
Key words: crop insurance, forward pricing, optimal hedging, put options, risk,
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Introduction
The context in which farm program crop producers make futures marketing decisions
has been dramatically altered by government policy in recent years. The 1996 Farm Bill
replaced deficiency payments, which (like put options) provided farmers larger payoffs
when prices were low, with fixed production flexibility payments. This has affected the
risk management decision environment for program crop producers.  What has been
less often addressed is the nearly simultaneous and rapid evolution of governmentally
subsidized insurance products. In recent years, the U.S. Department of Agriculture/Risk
Management Agency (USDA/RMA) has offered crop revenue insurance and allowed
private insurance firms to develop other revenue insurance products which were accepted
for subsidy and reinsurance. To date, three different individual coverage revenue insur-
ance products have been offered. The acceptance of these revenue insurance products
has been dramatic. Revenue products represented approximately 50% of U.S. corn and
soybean acres insured above the catastrophic level in 1999 (USDA/RMA).
Because these revenue insurance products deal with both price and yield risk, it is
relevant to ask what implications these subsidized insurance products have for producer
forward contracting demand. If they do affect the demand for forward contracting, then
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in what direction and magnitude? Further, these revenue insurance designs differ in the
coverage provided. Thus, it is plausible that the various insurance designs could result
in substantially differing hedging demand.
This issue has two important implications. First, producers are confronted with a new
decision context for risk management. The advent of revenue insurance forces producers
to consider price and yield risk management in a context where insurance may poten-
tially subsume the price  risk that forward pricing tools also mitigate. Consequently,
optimal producer risk management  behavior may need to adapt to this new scenario.
Second, the expansion of federally subsidized insurance and the introduction of new
insurance designs such as revenue insurance have the potential to affect the demand
for private risk management tools. This ancillary effect of such changes to farm policy
has not, to our knowledge, been addressed.  In a policy environment where protecting
producers  from risk has a  common political appeal, the  potential for overwhelming
private risk markets with subsidized public alternatives appears real.
The above discussion prompts consideration of the joint optimization of insurance and
hedging decisions. The work on optimal hedging for crop growers who face yield as well
as price risk traces to McKinnon, who reported that minimum-variance  hedge levels
decline as yield variability increases relative to price variability. Quantifying the yield
variability to obtain meaningful empirical results has proven to be difficult due to the
paucity offarm-level observations. Grant and others provided empirical estimates using
county yields, which typically show optimal hedge ratios of 60% or less. Miller and Kahl
demonstrated that estimates based on farm-level data may deviate substantially from
those based on aggregate yield data.
More recently, Lapan and Moschini have shown how optimal hedge ratios can be
determined in an expected utility framework for the farmer with constant absolute
risk aversion (CARA)  and joint normally distributed yield, price,  and basis. They
provided a closed-form solution for the CARA case and examples of numerical solu-
tions under constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). Their results revealed that utility-
maximizing hedge ratios depend on risk attitudes and generally differ from minimum-
variance hedge ratios.
When instruments such as insurance or put options are used to manage risk, the
derivatives  of revenue become  discontinuous,  making the search for an optimum
more difficult. Poitras addressed the analytical issues associated with the use of such
censuring instruments. Lapan, Moschini, and Hanson examined the joint use of futures
and options in an expected utility framework. They found that only futures enter into
the optimal solution when prices are unbiased  and yield risk is absent. Based on
findings  of subsequent studies, when yield risk is present but insurance is not used,
options may enter into the optimal hedge. Sakong, Hayes, and Hallam allowed for price,
basis, and yield risk in an analytical model which suggested producers underhedge in
futures and purchase put options. Moschini and Lapan also observed options entering
the optimal portfolio, with both papers finding the optimal strategy being conditional
on yield-price correlation.
Relatively few studies have addressed the combined effects of yield and price instru-
ments. The work on combined yield and price hedging was a step in this direction. The
introduction of yield futures by the Chicago Board of Trade created a yield risk market
to complement the traditional price futures contract. This led to investigations of
the combination of price and yield futures hedging by Li and Vukina for corn in North
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Carolina; Tirupattur,  Hauser,  and Chaherli  for soybeans  in Illinois; and Heifner and
Coble (1996a) for corn across the United States. In general, these papers report a comple-
mentarity between price and yield risk futures, but that yield futures tend to involve
significant basis risk which is not present in an individual yield insurance product.
Previous analyses of the joint use of crop insurance  and hedging are even fewer in
number. Dhuyvetter and Kastens examined combinations of hedging with yield insur-
ance and with a particular form of revenue insurance-Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC).
However, they do not directly address hedging levels, but rather show comparisons  of
mean and variance of returns. Wang et al. investigated the joint use of hedging with
either individual yield or area yield insurance. Comparisons are made between producer
willingness to pay for alternative insurance designs optimized with futures and options.
However,  optimal hedge levels are not reported.
There are several challenges to modeling the interactions of insurance with forward
pricing instruments. First, crop revenues,  which are products  of random yields times
random prices, are potentially non-Gaussian, making mean-variace methods question-
able.1 Second, deviations in revenue distributions from normality are increased by crop
insurance and put options, which add censored distributions that generally are highly
skewed as components  of revenue.  Moreover, the underlying yield and price  distribu-
tions often are non-Gaussian, thus affecting the modeling of risk instruments such as
yield insurance or a futures hedge. Nelson and Preckel have given strong support to the
notion that yields often appear to be non-Gaussian.  When modelin  the joint distribu-
tion of price times yield, care must also be given to the potential for correlation of price
and yield to influence outcomes. Recent research by Hennessy, Babcock, and Hayes, and
by Heifner  and Coble  (1996b)  has reported strong indication of negative  correlation
between farm yield and market price for corn in major production regions.
In this study we  analyze the relationship of four insurance  designs to the optimal
hedge ratio of a risk-averse corn producer. Specifically, the sensitivity of  ptimal hedge
and put ratios to varying levels of insurance is shown. The following section reports an
investigation  of the  analytical  relationship  between  yield  insurance  and  hedging.
Numerical procedures are then used to evaluate the interaction between hedging and
four alternative insurance designs. In particular, we incorporate farm-level yield infor-
mation, which more accurately characterizes yield variability and its effect on optimal
decisions. The analysis is replicated across four regionally diverse representative farms.
This allows comparisons of how differences in yield variability and yield-price correla-
tion affect outcomes, and shows the diversity of outcomes across regions.
The Behavioral Model
The planting-time  optimization behavior of a producer with yield insurance  and the
opportunity to hedge is examined. The producer is assumed to maximize expected utility
according to a von Neumann-Morgenstern  utility function defined over end-of-season
wealth (W) and which is strictly increasing,  concave,  and twice continuously differen-
tiable. For ease of illustration, the price basis (local cash price-futures price) is omitted
1Mean-variance  analysis is strictly applicable to the crop hedging problem only if revenue is normally distributed or utility
is quadratic. However, since the revenue is the product of two random variables, normality is a strong assumption. Quadratic
utility implies decreasing marginal utility at some point, which generally is unrealistic.
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from the analytical model such that price and yield remain as the two stochastic vari-
ables. Additionally,  price  and yield are assumed  to be distributed bivariate  normal.
Later numerical simulations relax the distributional assumptions and incorporate basis
risk.
Insurance has the effect of censoring the realizations of the underlying random vari-
able. In the case of yield insurance, a yield guarantee level (yg) is set as a percentage of
the expected yield. If yield (y) falls below the guarantee level, the production shortfall
is replaced.2 Thus, the producer observes:
(1)  yg  if y<yg, and
y  if y  Yg.
End-of-season wealth is then conditional on whether insurance payouts are made, and
may be written as follows:
(2a)  ify < yg  WL  = WO +A[P1Y - C -R(g)  +  h(po -p,) +pg(yg -y)];
(2b)  otherwise,  WH= W O+A[py -C  -R(yg)  +  h(po -p)],
where WH and WL  denote end-of-period wealth associated with yields above and below
the yield guarantee, respectively. Initial wealwth is represented by W  and crop acres by
A. Crop prices are denoted byp. Price is subscripted by 0 to identify a known planting-
time expectation of harvest price, and subscripted by 1 to denote the stochastic harvest-
time price. Nonstochastic production cost is denoted as C. Crop insurance premiums,
R(yg), represent the cost of purchasing insurance and are an increasing function of the
yield guarantee. The quantity of the crop forward priced with a futures hedge is denoted
by h. These contracts  are rigidly defined  as to delivery time, quality, and quantity.  A
growing crop can be hedged by selling futures contracts equal to a portion of the expected
crop before harvest and purchasing an equal number of futures contracts later when the
actual crop is sold.
Let random harvest-time price and yield be normal variates, where y is defined over
the support [y, y ], andp1 is defined over [p, p . Assuming bivariate normality, the joint
cumulative distribution is F(y,p),  where [py, ps  ] represents the means, [y, op1] the stand-
ard deviations, and p represents the correlation coefficient, all of which characterize the
distribution.
The  objective function  of a producer choosing the optimal hedge level may then be
written as follows:
(3)  MaxL  = f  |f  U(WL)f(y, p) dydpl  +  pf  U(WH)f(y,  p)  dydp 1 .
In this model, the producer's utility is evaluated as the sum of expected utility in the WL
states where yield is certain, and the WH states where yield is random. The producer's
choice variable (h) represents the quantity of production to hedge given that the producer
2 Federal Multiple-Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI) yield shortfalls are valued at planting-time price. The MPCI price guar-
antee is based on internal USDA forecasts rather than directly tied to the futures markets. However, preseason futures prices
are used here.
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is insured. The first-order condition (after dividing through byA and assuming all deriv-
atives exist at the optimum) is:
(4)  Lh  =  [  p fU(WL)(p  -Pl)f(y,  p)  dydp  -
fP  U'(WH)(Po -P1)f(Y,  Pl)dydp 1 ]
The effect of a change in yg on the optimal h is derived using Leibnitz' rule where the
bound of integration is a function of the variable of interest. The effect may be written
h(5)  h  Lh-y  1  fI  WaR(yg))PW  o  - (Po  -P)f(y, p)dydp 1 -
Oyg  Lhh  Lhh  . y  ayg
fPsrYU(WH)  aR(y)(po -P)f(y, Pl)dydpl,
P  yg  k  8yg  )
where Lhh = a2L/h 2 < 0 by assumption. The sign of the term aR(yg)/ayg is positive given
that premiums increase with higher coverage. The derivatives of  utility take the assumed
signs U' > 0, and U" < 0. Note that (po - p1) is included in each term, but evaluated over
a different portion of the joint distribution. A perception of bias in futures prices would
affect the outcomes; however, the assumption of unbiasedness will be maintained here.
Bivariate normality allows the signing of this term over differing portions of the distri-
bution.
The right-hand side of equation (5) can be shown positive. Since Lhh is negative, the
leading term is positive. Inside the bracket, the first term contains U"(WL) which is neg-
ative, as is (po - p ,), because it is evaluated over the range y < yg. Negative correlation
implies that pi > po. The term (pO  - aR(yg)/dyg) can be treated as a constant and inter-
preted as the difference in the rate of change in expected indemnity (po) and premium
(aR(yg)layg) as yg is changed. For actuarially fair insurance, these two rates of change
must be equal.
In a subsidized product such as the recently reformed U.S. crop insurance program,
the increase in indemnity would exceed the increase in premium because the producer
is not paying the full cost of insurance at any level of coverage. Then, in marginal terms,
the producer would not pay the full change in premium resulting from increased cover-
age. Actuarially fair insurance will result in the first term of equation (5) falling out. An
assumption of subsidized insurance will result in the first term having a positive value.
The second term inside the bracket has a leading negative sign. Inside the second term,
U"(WH) is negative, while  aR(yg)/dyg is again assumed positive. In this term, (Po - p1) is
positive as it is evaluated over the rangey >yg such that E[pl  y >  Yg]  > E[pl] if p <  .The
second term can also be unequivocally  signed positive as the expectation  within the
double integral is negative, but multiplied by a leading negative sign.
Under these assumptions, yield insurance is shown to be complementary to hedging.
To our knowledge, this is a result not previously reported in the literature, but is
consistent with previous research which finds that hedging levels are inversely related
to yield variability.  Because yield insurance censors the yield distribution from below,
there is a reduction in downside yield variability.  However, it is not at all clear that
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revenue insurance would have the same effect because it subsumes price risk as well as
yield risk.
The numerical analysis investigates these other insurance designs using farm-level
data and relaxing the joint normality assumptions. We turn to numerical procedures to
allow investigation of the full set of yield and revenue  designs under a common set of
assumptions. As will be described in the next section, the alternative  designs involve
fundamentally different censoring of the yield, price, or revenue distribution. Further,
some of the insurance designs involve mixtures of protection that add complexity to the
problem. When insurance is combined with options, there is multiple censoring of various
portions of the revenue distribution.  These mixtures  of censoring have the potential
effect of limiting analytical models that require differentiability.
The Risk Management Tools Examined
In our numerical analysis, four insurance products are modeled to reflect the products
that are  now appearing in the crop insurance market.  The crop  insurance products
currently offered to farmers in the United States fall into four categories depending on:
(a) whether yield or revenue per acre is guaranteed, and (b) whether indemnities are
paid at a price set at sign-up time or at the higher of the sign-up time and harvest-time
prices. There are reasons to expect that each type of insurance has a different effect on
optimal hedging levels. Revenue insurance is expected to result in lower hedge ratios
than yield insurance  because it partly  substitutes  for forward pricing in protecting
against price declines.  Indemnifying losses at the higher of sign-up and harvest-time
prices is expected to increase the optimal hedge ratio because it increases the effect
of price change  on the farmer's  income. One of our objectives is to quantify these
differences.
Multiple-Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI) is the traditional crop yield insurance program
generally available for major crops in most states. Market Value Protection (MVP) is a
private product that modifies the traditional crop yield insurance design by increasing
the value of lost production if prices increase  during the season. Our representation
of revenue insurance is a pure revenue  insurance design similar to either Revenue
Assurance (RA) or Income Protection (IP), which are currently offered by the RMA and
available for a limited set of major crops and regions. Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) is
a revenue insurance product which provides increasing coverage when prices increase
during the season.  CRC is also a federally  subsidized product and is the most widely
offered  revenue  design.  Thus, two  of the four designs examined  are yield triggered,
while the remaining two are revenue triggered. A brief explanation of each instrument
follows.
MPCI indemnifies yield losses when an insured acreage's yield falls below the guar-
anteed yield level. These losses are valued at a preseason price selected at sign-up time.
The equation for MPCI may be written as follows:
(6)  NIMPCI  fo* Max[yyo  - Y,  0]  - RMPCi,
where NI is the net return to insurance purchase,  6 is the percentage  of the maximum
price  election, fo is the preseason  price for a harvest month futures contract,  y is the
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insurance coverage level, and yo and y  are, respectively, the expected farm yield at
planting and realized yield at harvest. Although RMA allows producers to select a price
election that is a percentage  of the  preseason  price,  we assume  that producers  are
insuring at 100% of the preseason expected price. Summaries of RMA data indicate that
98% of Midwestern  corn producers  insuring above the fully subsidized  catastrophic
coverage insurance choose the 100% price election. The insurance premium, R, reflects
the producer paid insurance premium cost for the policy. The  subscripts on NI and R
denote the type of insurance evaluated.
The Market Value Protection (MVP) design, shown in equation (7), is also yield
triggered. However, in this case, losses are valued at the maximum of either springtime
expected price or the actual harvest-time price, fi. Price is multiplied by 0.95 to reflect
an average basis in the futures market:
(7)  NIMvp  = 0.95  * Max[f,  f]*  Max[yyo  - Y1,  0]  - RMp.
Since 1997, three types of farm-level revenue insurance have been offered to U.S.
producers-Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC), Income Protection (IP), and Revenue Assur-
ance (RA). All three of these products insure the gross revenue of the insured crop. The
products differ in rate-setting procedures and locations where they are offered. All three
are reinsured and subsidized by the USDA  and use harvest-month  futures prices  at
sign-up and at harvest to compute losses. Because of similarities in design, we treat IP
and RA as a single insurance type, designated as Revenue Insurance (RI). Equation (8)
shows the net returns from RI. Here, shortfalls in harvest revenue (flyl) trigger losses
rather than y1, as in the case of yield insurance:
(8)  NIRI  = Max[yfOy  - fl,  ]  - RRI
The final insurance design investigated in this study is Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC).
This insurance design combines the revenue insurance protection of RI with the "upside"
price protection of MVP. Ninety-five percent of  the maximum of preseason price expecta-
tions or the actual harvest-time futures is used to compute the coverage:
(9)  NIcRc  = Max[0.95y Max[fo , fi]yo - fil 1 0] - RCRC.
Two forms of forward pricing are modeled: futures hedging and the purchase of put
options.  The net return for each forward pricing strategy is denoted by NF. The net
returns from futures marketing are modeled in equation (10):
(10)  NIF = aFYo(fo  fl) - RF
As shown, futures hedging protects against price risk on a given quantity hedged. The
futures marketing hedge ratio is represented by aF, and is the proportion of the expected
yield that is protected. In this case, the cost of risk protection (RF) reflects commissions
and interest charges to carry out the hedging transaction. The returns from a put option
contract are shown in equation (11):
NFp  = axpy  * Max[yfo -f , 0]  - Rp.
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In this case, the put option ratio is denoted by ap, and represents the proportion of the
expected yield covered by options. The option strike price relative to the futures price is
y. The cost of a put option (Rp) includes the option premium, commissions, and interest
charges for capital invested.
Combining forward pricing and insurance results in additional terms added to the
end-of-period wealth states, which may be written:
(12)  W/k  = Wo+  A[p1ly-  C+ NI  +  NFk],
wherej represents the alternative insurance design and k the forward pricing alter-
native.
Stochastic  Specification
In the model, end-of-period wealth, and thus utility, is a function of three random var-
iables: farm yield (Y1), futures prices (f1), and harvest-time basis (b), where p1 = f1 + b.
At decision time, expected yield (yo), current futures price for the harvest month contract
(fo), and the expected basis are assumed known. Harvest-time futures prices are gener-
ated assuming a multiplicative  shock such that:
(13)  fi =foe1
where el is the relative futures price movement from planting to harvest-time,  and is
assumed to follow a log-normal distribution.3
Local harvest-time prices are generated as follows:
(14)  Pl = f  + b  2
where bo reflects the expected harvest-time basis, and 82 represents deviations in the
realized basis from the expected basis. Basis risk (e2)  is assumed normally distributed.
The expected futures price was set at $2.50 and price variability over the growing
season at 20%, respectively,  to represent typical price levels and volatility. The mean
and variance for each location were calculated from differences between state average
prices received by farmers, as reported by the USDA's National Agricultural Statistics
Service  (NASS), and monthly averages of futures settlement prices for the month of
November over the years  1976-95.
Farm yield variability is represented by augmenting the potentially nonnormal
county yield series  with information  on the difference  between  county yield and
yield of farms in the county. This follows Miranda in assuming that farm yield varia-
bility may be treated as being composed of a systemic portion correlated  with county
yields and idiosyncratic individual  variation. This  approach is taken to  augment
fairly short available farm yield series with the added information available at the
county level.
3 The log-normal assumption is well accepted in commodity pricing literature (e.g., the Black-Scholes option valuation
model is based on log-normality). Shapiro-Wilk and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of the assumption failed to reject the log-
normal assumption.
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NASS county yield data over the years 1956-95  were used to estimate each county
yield distribution.4 Technological trends in yields were taken into account by a linear
trend estimator using weighted least squares to corrected for heteroskedasticity.  The
variances of farm-county yield differences were estimated by combining 1985-94 farm
yield observations provided by the RMA with corresponding county yield observations
and pooling all farms in the county. Farms with at least six years of actual yields during
the 10-year period were used in the analysis. Farm yield variances by county were esti-
mated as the sum of the estimated county yield variance and the average variance of
farm-county yield differences for farms in the county. Omission of covariances is justified
by the assumption that farm-county yield differences are, on average, uncorrelated with
county yields (Miranda).  Given that a representative  farm for a particular county is
being constructed, the acre-weighted  average of all farm-county yield differences will
equal zero (proof of this assumption is provided in the appendix).
Potential nonnormality of the county yield is addressed by transforming the data to
approximate normality with a hyperbolic tangent transformation. This general approach
avoids making specific distributional assumptions. Moss and Shonkwiler; Ramirez; and
Taylor have proposed various forms of hyperbolic transformations and applied them to
crop yield distributions.  Our analysis follows the hyperbolic tangent transformation
proposed  by  Taylor.  The transformation  to normality  involves  first expressing  the
cumulative density as a hyperbolic tangent function of linearly detrended yield, y:
(15)  F(y)  = 0.5  + 0.5 * tanh(P0 + Py +  p  2y  +  +  3),
where F(y) is the empirical cumulative density function (CDF), and the p's are esti-
mated with maximum-likelihood  procedures.
Farm yield for a farm with a mean yield equal to the county mean is modeled as yf =
pi + £s, with  e3 defined as:
(16)  £3  =  P(T-F(,) -P)
where yf is farm yield, p, is the expected county yield, P is the ratio of farm yield standard
deviation relative to the county yield standard deviation estimated from the variances
of county yield and farm-county yield differences, T-1is the inverse of the Taylor trans-
formation, and F(e)  is the distribution of the standard normal.
Product moment correlations  are used  to model relationships  between  the trans-
formed random variables. The correlations between yield, futures price, and basis were
estimated using transformed data over the 1975-95 period.
Methods for Estimating Expected Utility
Under Alternative Strategies
Given the specified stochastic structure, the farmer's expected utility under each combin-
ation of risk management strategies is estimated using Gaussian quadrature. Gaussian
quadrature generally is the preferred form of numerical integration because it gives
greater accuracy for the same number of calculations, or equivalently, requires fewer
4Jerry Skees (Department of Agricultural Economics, the University of Kentucky) assembled the county yield observations
prior to 1972.
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calculations for any given level of accuracy, than trapezoidal integration or use of
Simpson's rule. This advantage is obtained by relaxing the requirement that the areas
summed under the function are  of equal widths (Gerald and Wheatley).  An n-point
Gaussian quadrature will compute the integral of a function exactly if the function is
a polynomial of order 2n - 1 or less (Miranda and Fackler). Because this model contains
multiple random variables,  higher order quadratures are used where applicable.  The
accuracy  of the Gaussian quadrature  approximation  is conditional on the number of
quadrature nodes used. The GAUSS software  allows a maximum of 40 quadrature
nodes, and this maximum is applied to all random variables in our analysis. Bounds of
plus and minus four standard deviations are imposed on the multivariate normal distri-
bution. Gaussian quadrature is used initially, as needed, to estimate the expected value
of crop sales and fair premiums for insurance and options. Then it is used to estimate
expected utility for alternative scenarios.
The search for optimal hedge ratios conditional on insurance coverage is performed
by using a quadratic approximation of the response of expected utility to variation
in the hedge ratio. This is the starting point for a step search which changes  the
ratio up and down in 1% increments until an optimum is found. These evaluations
are repeated across insurance coverage levels in increments of 5%. Such an approach
allows examination  of the effect  of insurance on optimal  hedging across  a range  of
insurance coverages.
Representative Farms and Base Scenarios
Having described the general decision model  and the numerical procedures used, we
now detail the specific characteristics of the four representative farms. Because price
variability tends to differ little among farms, and basis risk is small relative to price
risk, regional  differences are most apparent in yield variability and yield-price  corre-
lation. Four counties were chosen to represent farms from areas with differing levels of
yield variability and yield-price correlation.  Statistics for these counties are reported in
table 1. Iroquois County in east central Illinois was chosen to represent the typical Corn
Belt case of relatively low yield variability and yield-price correlation that is strongly
negative. Douglas County in east central Kansas represents an area with relatively high
yield variability  and negative yield-price  correlation.  Lincoln County in west central
Nebraska is an irrigated area with low yield variability and low yield-price correlation.
Pitt County in east central North Carolina is representative of an area with high yield
variability and low yield-price correlation. Statistical tests of correlation were conducted
for each location and are found significantly different from zero in Kansas and Illinois.
Certainty equivalent gains are derived by calculating the certainty equivalent revenue
associated with the expected utility for a particular risk protection scenario and compar-
ing it to the certainty equivalent revenue for the scenario where no risk instruments are
used. The use of certainty equivalents facilitates comparison of scenarios in a convenient
money metric (Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson). Results are estimated for two combin-
ations of initial wealth and risk aversion using constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
utility functions.5 Initial wealth level for a farm with 500 acres of corn is set at
5  The power utility function is used. This function is of the form:  U =  1/(1 -r)W
(
1
-r) if r , 1, otherwise U =  ln(W).Journal  ofAgricultural and  Resource Economics
Table 1. Estimated Parameters for the Counties Included in the Numerical
Analysis
Counties
Parameter  Iroquois, IL  Douglas, KS  Lincoln, NE  Pitt, NC
Basis ($/bu.)  Mean  -0.24  -0.15  -0.26  0.00
Std. Dev.  0.14  0.17  0.17  0.20
Futures Price-Basis  Correlation  -0.28  -0.27  -0.46  0.16
County Yield-Basis  Correlation  0.18  -0.01  0.06  -0.44
Farm Price  Mean  2.24  2.33  2.20  2.52
CV  0.22  0.21  0.21  0.23
Farm Yield  Mean  143.20  90.48  150.30  87.70
CV  0.20  0.34  0.15  0.40
Farm Yield-Price  Correlation  -0.40*  -0.35*  -0.13  -0.17
Note: An asterisk (*) denotes statistically different from zero at the 0.10 level.
Table 2.  Optimal Hedge Ratio and Certainty Equivalent Gains for the Four
Representative Farms, Without Insurance
CRRA = 2  CRRA = 4
Wealth = $300,000  Wealth = $300,000
Optimal Hedge  Cert. Equiv.  Optimal Hedge  Cert. Equiv.
Location  Ratio (%)  Gain ($)  Ratio (%)  Gain ($)
Iroquois County, IL  22  0.14  22  0.91
Douglas County, KS  0  0.00  0  0.00
Lincoln County, NE  55  2.31  61  6.01
Pitt County, NC  32  0.48  35  0.65
$300,000. Relative risk aversion is assigned a value of 2 to represent moderate risk
aversion and is set at 4 to represent high risk aversion. The certainty equivalent measures
show how the individual's initial wealth and degree of risk aversion  affect the gains
from alternative strategies.  However, the estimated certainty equivalent dollar gains
are not necessarily representative because they rest on assumptions about wealth and
risk aversion.
In all locations and scenarios, the costs of using futures and at-the-money options are
specified with commissions of $50 per contract and margin deposits at 8%. The farmer's
interest on initial margin  deposits  and options premiums  is  assumed to  have an
opportunity cost of 8% over the six-month growing season. Insurance is assumed to be
actuarially fair, with no administrative costs included.6
6 RMA crop insurance programs are subsidized at varying levels. This would clearly influence the decision to insure and
the level of insurance coverage. These decisions are made prior to the sign-up deadline which is generally prior to planting.
Subsidies are omitted in this analysis to clarify the risk benefits of the instruments.
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Results
The optimal hedge ratio without insurance for each of the four representative  farms is
examined first. Table 2 shows the optimal planting-time hedge ratio and certainty
equivalent gain from hedging in each of the four county locations. The differences in the
underlying yield variability and yield-price correlation result in optimal hedge ratios
ranging from  no hedging up to hedging  61%  of the expected  crop  under strong  risk
aversion.  The highest hedge ratio (Lincoln County, Nebraska) results in the location
where yield-price  correlation is low and yield variability is relatively  low due to the
predominance  of irrigation in this county. Conversely, the lowest optimal hedge ratio
(Douglas County, Kansas) occurs in the location where yield-price correlation is strongly
negative and yield variability is relatively large. These two locations confirm that the
demand for hedging is negatively correlated with yield variability and yield-price corre-
lation, as suggested by McKinnon, and by Moschini and Lapan.
The finding that the optimal hedge ratio is relatively low in areas  of high yield
variability is consistent with the inverse relationship between optimal hedging ratios
and yield uncertainty. Greater uncertainty of yield increases the probability that the
hedged quantity will not be produced, leaving the producer with an uncovered hedge
position. We  suggest that the finding that hedge ratios tend to be lower in areas  of
stronger negative yield-price  correlation is interpreted as an artifact of a "natural
hedge" existing between price and yield (Miranda and Glauber). When price and yield
move inversely, a producer can expect higher prices in a low yield year and vice versa.
By hedging, price is locked into a particular level (ignoring basis risk). Thus, the natural
hedge is eliminated.
Certainty equivalent gains, which reflect the increased producer welfare from risk
reduction, are also reported in table 2.  Our findings reveal a generally small gain
relative to the per acre crop value. The estimates shown are based on an assumed CRRA
of 2. The estimates are, of course, sensitive to the degree of risk aversion assumed.
However, the greatest gain does come in Nebraska where the hedging appears most
effective.
The two other locations are representative of areas where yield-price correlation and
yield variability produce a mixed effect. The moderately risk-averse Iroquois County,
Illinois, farm has a 22% hedge ratio (table 2) which is constrained by the strongly nega-
tive yield-price correlation in spite of a relatively low yield variability. The Pitt County,
North Carolina, farm's base case hedge ratio is 32% under moderate risk aversion. Here
the natural hedge does not exist to limit the optimal hedge ratio, but the relatively large
yield variability appears to be a more significant factor in revenue variability.7
Interestingly, the hedge ratio in Douglas County, Kansas, remains at zero even under
the assumption of a more risk-averse producer (table 2). In this location with a strongly
negative yield-price correlation associated with highly variable yields, hedging appears
the least valuable. However, given efficient market assumptions, this may appear sur-
prising. As reported more fully later in this article, we conclude that transaction costs
in this particular instance outweigh the certainty equivalent gain for this location.
7Given that the yield-price correlation for the Nebraska and North Carolina locations were not statistically different from
zero, auxiliary models were run which assumed the yield-price correlation was zero. For both locations, the optimal hedge
ratio increased approximately 10%-15% throughout the range of coverages. Otherwise, the findings are essentially the same.
In particular, the relative ordering of hedge ratios across insurance designs remains unchanged.
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Examination  of the certainty  equivalent gains reported in table 2 shows that the
gain in expected utility induced by hedging is generally low, even with the strongly
risk-averse  case.  For example,  these hedge ratios are  generally lower than those
found  by Moschini  and Lapan.  Transaction  costs have  been included  here which
diminish the value to hedging to the risk-averse producer. While the commission paid
for a futures contract and the interest charged are small in relation to the value of
the contract, when compared to the certainty  equivalent gain provided by futures
contracts this cost looms as a significant factor. Further, by using farm-level data,
we have  relatively higher yield variability in the empirical  specification than has
often been used previously.  For example (from table  1),  two of the counties have  a
farm-level yield coefficient of variation (CV) above 0.30 (the highest level examined
by Moschini and Lapan).
The effect of various insurance designs on forward pricing hedge and put ratios was
computed for insurance coverages varying from zero to 100%  of expected yield in 5%
increments. This permitted the examination of  the potentiall  nonlinear responso of the
optimal hedge as insurance levels are varied. Although insurance coverage  above the
85% leverage is not allowed in any of the programs investigated here, the analysis was
carried to the  100%  level to more fully reveal the relationship  between  a particular
insurance program and the optimal hedge ratio.
Figure  1 shows the futures hedging level found for each insurance design for ea  inn  iach  of
the four county locations, given CRRA = 2 and transaction costs are imposed. First, very
low levels of insurance protection had little effect on the optional hedge ratio in any of
the four representative farms. The Pitt County, North Carolina, farm saw the earliest
change in the optimal hedge ratio at 5%  insurance coverage.  The Lincoln County,
Nebraska, optimal hedge was unaffected by insurance coverage until coverage reached
the 60% level. Given the relevant range of insurance coverage levels offered in the U.S.
is 50%-75%,  little change in observed hedging demand would be expected from any of
the designs in the Nebraska case.
As the insurance coverage  is increased  for each  of the four locations,  a consistent
relationship is found as one compares across the four insurance designs. For each of the
locations, at higher coverage levels, MVP is always associated with the highest optimal
hedge. MPCI is the second highest. The revenue products, CRC and RI, ranked third
and fourth, respectively. The two yield insurance designs, when they do cause a change
in the optimal hedge, always result in an increased optimal hedge. Thus, yield insurance
designs are found to be purely complementary to hedging as was found in the analytical
model.  It  would appear that the MVP component which indemnifies  producers at the
greater of preseason price or harvest-time price does provide a slightly greater optimal
hedge than MPCI in most cases.
The revenue insurance designs show a more complex relationship with the optimal
hedge. The "MVP-like" component of CRC results in an optimal hedge for CRC that is
always equal to or greater than that of RI. In fact, CRC is always found to increase the
optimal hedge over the uninsured case in three of the four locations.  The Lincoln
County, Nebraska, case is the exception with CRC resulting in lower than uninsured
hedging levels when CRC coverage reaches 60% of expected revenue.  Interestingly,
results for RI reveal a nonlinear relationship with hedging. For example, in Illinois,
an increase in hedging occurs  over the mid-range  of coverages,  but as RI coverage
increases, the optimal hedge ratio begins to fall. This suggests RI has the strongest
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substitution effect on hedging of the four insurance designs. In contrast, these results
for the two revenue insurance products indicate there is a mixed effect of revenue
insurance  on the optimal  hedge.  As  the level  of RI  is increased,  it appears it is
increasingly a substitute for the price protection of a hedge. It is also clear that the
upside price component of CRC makes it more complementary to hedging since this
component is like a futures call-i.e., it increases the insurance payout when prices
increase.
The relationship between insurance coverage and at-the-money put option ratios is
explored in figure 2. Analyzed over the same range of insurance coverages as for futures,
the put option percentages tend to follow a similar pattern. As observed when comparing
between the hedge and put ratios, in general, the put ratio is higher. It appears the
higher option ratios occur because options hedgers are not subject to such large losses
in low yield-high price years as are futures hedgers who may have to buy back their
contracts at a high price.
As for hedge ratios, the put ratios compared across insurance designs show that when
differences appear, MVP results in the highest put ratio, followed by MPCI, CRC, and
RI, respectively. The effects of purchasing insurance on the optimal put do not become
pronounced until higher levels of coverage. In Nebraska, there is no change until insur-
ance coverage is above 50%. A different relationship is observed between CRC and put
option levels than was found in the relationship of CRC and futures hedging. In figure 2, it can be seen that CRC tends to be more competitive with puts than with hedging.
For example, in Illinois, increasing CRC tends to increase futures hedging. However, it
causes reduced put percentages  at higher levels of coverage. This likely results from
CRC being a lower-bounding activity and thus competes more directly with puts, which
are also lower-bounding. In contrast, futures are lower- and upper-bounding. In other
words, the upside price protection provided by CRC is similar to a call option in that the
payoff increases as the price rises. This complements a futures hedge given a net posi-
tion similar to a synthetic put. Such strong complementarity is absent when CRC is
combined with a put option.
To further investigate the implications of transaction costs, which were posited as a
factor causing the zero hedge ratio in the Douglas County, Kansas, case, the analysis
in figures  1 and  2 was replicated with all transaction  costs removed. This entailed
dropping the commission charges for futures and options contracts and eliminating the
interest charge on margin accounts. Results of these replications are shown in figures
3 and 4.
In general, the elimination of transaction costs raised the optimal hedge ratio from
10% to 15% in all four locations. In particular, the Douglas County, Kansas, location has
a positive hedge ratio, albeit the lowest of the four locations. Examination of figure 3 as
compared  to figure  1 shows that the pattern  of optimal hedges remains very similar
throughout the range of insurance coverage levels. Figure 4 reports the same analysis
for optimal put ratios. As with futures, removal of the transaction costs does not alter
the ranking for the various insurance products except to shift put ratios upward  by
roughly 25%  on average.  Thus, we find that transaction  costs can have a nontrivial
influence on optimal hedge and put ratios. Even though transaction costs are relatively
small, they are sufficient to offset the certainty equivalent gain.
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Conclusions
The proliferation of new insurance products greatly changes the context in which hedging
decisions are made. This study was conducted to provide analysis of optimal futures and
put hedging levels when producers have yield, price, and revenue risk management mar-
kets available to them. The. analytical results show an unambiguous  positive relation
between crop yield insurance and the optimal quantity hedged. Numerical estimates are
provided to allow for nonnormality in yields and show the magnitude of the effects of
alternative insurance designs on optimal hedges under different cropping conditions.
In general, revenue insurance tends to result in lower hedging demand than would
occur given the same level of yield insurance coverage.  However, the differences tend
to be small (no more than 10%)  over the relevant range of insurance  coverage. This
study also finds a consistent pattern that the upside price protection afforded by MVP
and CRC designs tends to be more complementary to hedging than the RI design. To the
extent that producers would switch from yield insurance to revenue insurance, there
would be a decline in the demand for hedging. Pure revenue insurance  designs are
shown to have a strong substitution  effect on hedging. Substantial  nonlinearities in
these relations are observed.  In general,  as insurance levels increase above the  70%
coverage  level, the effect on hedging increases rapidly.
Because some of the insurance tools examined in this study are so new to producers
and are sufficiently distinct in their design, producers at this point may have difficulty
evaluating the decisions modeled here. One might expect that as producers become more
familiar with the implications of these alternatives, there will be an evolution in how
producers utilize the combinations  of insurance and forward pricing instruments.
There appear to be several natural extensions to this work. Obviously,  other crops
and regions may be  examined.  Possibilities  of further risk reductions by  combining
insurance with the joint use of futures and options (or combinations of options at differ-
ent strike prices) deserve exploration in light of the Sakong, Hayes, and Hallam, and
Moschini and Lapan results.
[Received January  2000; final revision received  August 2000.]
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Appendix:
Proof that the County Average Farm Yield Variance Equals
the County Yield Variance Plus the Average Variance
of Farm-County Yield Differences
County average yield in year t is:




where Yt is a random variable denoting yield on farm i, and the constants ai,  A, and N represent acreage
on farm i, the sum of acreages (ai) in the county, and the number of farms in the county, respectively.
Let
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(A2)  dit = Yit  - ct
be the farm-county yield difference for farm i, where lower-case letters represent deviations from means.
The variance of yield on farm i is:
W)  a2  =St=  lYit  _  t=l (ct + dt) 2 t= (ct2 + dt +  2ctdit)
(A3)  oi =  =  =-,
3  T  T  T
where T is the number of years observed.  The weighted average  of these farm yield variances for the
county is:
(A4)  a2  _  =  =  ai Et2=l (ct  +  d2t +  2ctdit) (A4)  -
AT
Equation (A4) may be rewritten as:
2  2  E  2  E  aET  id
(A5)  0
2 2  E+  =ai°di +  =2Ez=  ait=Ctdt
A  AT
where  o2 is the variance of county yield, and  o2  is the variance of farm-county yield differences for
farm i. Rearranging the summations in the third term shows that it equals zero:
2 ET  i C t EN1 aidit
(A6)  =0,
AT
because each year's weighted sum of farm-county yield deviations equals zero:
(A7)  E=1 aidit = O.
Thus, the average farm yield variance for the county equals the county yield variance plus the average
variance of farm-county  yield differences:
(A8)  a
2 =  2  C+  1 aidi
A